"If no one talks about it, there is a lot of room for extreme opinions"

The First Intifada was a grassroots-uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the living conditions therein which lasted from December 1987 to September 1993. Its resolution spawned the Oslo Accords and the expectations for a negotiated withdrawal of Israeli military occupation along with a transfer of power to Palestinian authorities, although not necessarily a Palestinian state. Their failure regarding further negotiations and implementation of provisions created further divisions that would spark the Second Intifada. Overall, almost 150 Israelis and over 1000 Palestinians died, of which a quarter were under the age of 17. Over three thousand Israelis and over a hundred-thousand Palestinians were injured over 6 years.

Following the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel took military control of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, controlling all remaining parts of historic Palestine. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were administered by the Israeli Ministry of Defence's "Civil Administration", which was responsible for the administration of the occupied territories. Whilst there were armed militias, most notably the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), resisting occupation through guerrilla warfare, the intifada did not arise from military confrontation. Instead, it primarily arose from youth-protests that had grown up under military occupation and its realities.

Between 1967 and 1987, the standing of Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) gradually deteriorated regarding their civic, political and economic rights, with Israeli settlement policy becoming more aggressive and increasingly expropriating Palestinian land in the oPt. Restrictions on exports, use of land and water and other means further hurt the Palestinian economy. At this time, movement between territories of Palestine and Israel was still possible, and many Palestinians worked in Israel. Such opportunities were not available to all however, and oPt saw high unemployment rates from restrictive policies. During the 70s, the global oil-slump and growing inflation which spiralled almost out of control in the 80s added to economic hardships.

In parallel, a new generation of Palestinians that had grown up under occupation, especially overcrowded refugee camps, would increasingly demonstrate Israeli military occupation, and become the face of the early mass protests leading up to 1987. The Israeli stance towards Palestinians and protests grew ever more militarised and securitised, fuelling tensions inside Palestine and Israel alike over the government's actions.

Indefinite detentions, deportations, demolitions of homes, beatings, collective punishment of communities in the form of curfews and water or electricity cuts, and a censure of all support for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or other political structures brought about a boiling point by 1987. Israeli leadership at the time believed in the importance of imposing an "Iron Fist" policy using aforementioned tactics, including live ammunition used against unarmed protestors, to quell protests. When in December 1987 an Israeli truck crashed into Palestinian cars at a checkpoint in Gaza just days after a Jew was murdered in the same area, spontaneous rioting spread across oPt and parts of Israel.

More than a supposed retaliatory act for the killing, the beginning of the First Intifada must be understood in the context of two decades of occupation and the deteriorating socioeconomic context of Palestinians, the youth in particular. In the first weeks, IDF soldiers used live-ammunition against unarmed protestors, many of them minors. Defence-minister Rabin shortly after laid out a policy of "force, might and beatings" that continued the Iron Fist policies, although with rubber bullets, which explains the high rate of a hundred-thousand plus wounded Palestinians. He also ordered soldiers to beat protestors, denying and being contradicted that he also said they should break the bones of arrested protestors (a video of one such incident would create a media-storm, a major rally in Tel-Aviv, and soldiers spoke up about it). Although most Palestinians protesters were non-violent or mostly armed with stones, some threw Molotov cocktails and guns were used later on as well.

Even if not all Palestinians initially supported the uprising, the military's response would close their ranks, and many grassroots movements would link efforts, with women notably leading many. In Israel, the heavy-handed response created much debate, although the political leadership would continue applying repressive policies.

Initially secrete peace-negotiations between Israeli and the PLO in Oslo finally brought a formal end to the Intifada in the form of the Oslo Accords and changed Israeli-Palestine relations to this day. The PLO - which previously denounced Israel's right to exist - accepted the Israeli state and was recognised as representative of the Palestinian people by Israel and the international community. Today's interpretation of the Oslo Accords is that it would have allowed for the creation of an eventual two-State solution through a political process through which issues on both sides would be resolved through negotiations and not violence. Initially, the recognition of a Palestinian state was explicitly avoided as part of the negotiation outcomes. More extreme forces on both sides challenged the peace-process: Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad would start their suicide attacks and reject any recognition of Israel whilst Benin would be assassinated by an ultranationalist Jew for supporting the peace process. As the negotiations dragged on into 2000, polarisation in both camps and new friction due to new settlements and other restrictions in oPt would eventually lead to the Second Intifada.

More than a supposed retaliatory act for the killing, the beginning of the First Intifada must be understood in the context of two decades of occupation and the deteriorating socioeconomic context of Palestinians, the youth in particular. In the first weeks, IDF soldiers used live-ammunition against unarmed protestors, many of them minors. Defence-minister Rabin shortly after laid out a policy of "force, might and beatings" that continued the Iron Fist policies, although with rubber bullets, which explains the high rate of a hundred-thousand plus wounded Palestinians. He also ordered soldiers to beat protestors, denying and being contradicted that he also said they should break the bones of arrested protestors (a video of one such incident would create a media-storm, a major rally in Tel-Aviv, and soldiers spoke up about it). Although most Palestinians protesters were non-violent or mostly armed with stones, some threw Molotov cocktails and guns were used later on as well.

Even if not all Palestinians initially supported the uprising, the military's response would close their ranks, and many grassroots movements would link efforts, with women notably leading many. In Israel, the heavy-handed response created much debate, although the political leadership would continue applying repressive policies.

Initially secrete peace-negotiations between Israeli and the PLO in Oslo finally brought a formal end to the Intifada in the form of the Oslo Accords and changed Israeli-Palestine relations to this day. The PLO - which previously denounced Israel's right to exist - accepted the Israeli state and was recognised as representative of the Palestinian people by Israel and the international community. Today's interpretation of the Oslo Accords is that it would have allowed for the creation of an eventual two-State solution through a political process through which issues on both sides would be resolved through negotiations and not violence. Initially, the recognition of a Palestinian state was explicitly avoided as part of the negotiation outcomes. More extreme forces on both sides challenged the peace-process: Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad would start their suicide attacks and reject any recognition of Israel whilst Benin would be assassinated by an ultranationalist Jew for supporting the peace process. As the negotiations dragged on into 2000, polarisation in both camps and new friction due to new settlements and other restrictions in oPt would eventually lead to the Second Intifada.

For weeks, Palestinian protesters clashed with Israeli police over the possible eviction of several Palestinian families in East Jerusalem's Sheikh Jarrah district. More than a family possibly becoming homeless, the evictions must be understood in the context of the occupation of Palestinian territories, of which East Jerusalem makes part. With Israeli settlers changing the demographic make-up of formerly Palestinian neighbourhoods and areas, initial protests quickly grew in size when police used heavy-handed tactics to quell unrest. Jewish extremists and Palestinians increasingly taunted each other and resorted to violence, with protests soon spreading across Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. When police breached the sacred al-Aqsa compound repeatedly during Ramadan following stones being thrown from it on police, exceptional images of teargas, rubber-bullets, and stun grenades shocked the world. In various Israeli cities, Arab and Jewish mobs fought each other, with Israeli police often shielding Israeli mobs.

The Gaza-based terrorist militia Hamas gave Israel an ultimatum to leave the compound and started firing over 4000 rockets into Israel when this didn't happen. Most were intercepted, but Israeli civilians endured trauma from constant alerts to run into shelter. Over 11 days, 13 Israelis were killed and 114 injured by rocket-fire from Gaza before a ceasrefire was agreed 21st May. In Gaza itself, over 250 people died from air-strikes by Israel and about 2000 were wounded. Several thousand remain homeless. Over 1000 houses were destroyed, and many more thousands are damaged. Of the 113.000 IDPs that the airstrikes created, all but 8000 were able to return to their homes. The psycho-social needs of children and adults are acute, but few medical facilities exist. The blockade and fear of new clashes and a possible new war are keeping reconstruction efforts limited, with no construction materials entering Gaza. Reconstruction efforts will cost anywhere between USD$290-380M. Currently, the peace holds despite incidents of incendiary balloons being flown from Gaza that Israel retaliated for with airstrikes.

New protests in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, continue. UNICEF reports at least 276 children injured by live ammunition, rubber-bullets, concussion grenades, and tear gas since the end of hostilities in May. The youthful nature of the protests have seen 145 children arrested in East Jerusalem in the same timeframe, with 1090 Palestinians injured overall. About 1600 Jewish Israelis entered the al-Aqsa / Temple Mount compound under police protection late July for commemorating the historic destruction of the Jewish Temples sparked The court-case over the Sheikh Jarrah evictions are ongoing and keep inciting protests.

Both sides are accused of indiscriminate targeting of civilians and war crimes. The International Criminal Court's ongoing investigation continues gathering evidence even as Israel claims it holds no jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian nor Israeli territories. In Gaza, at least 20 families were entirely eradicated from the bombing. Attacks on a building filled by international media and the bombing of a street without prior warning that killed 44 civilians is also another of multiple instances of potential war crimes committed. Equally, the UN's Human Rights Council established an ongoing independent, international commission of inquiry looking at all possible abuses committed against international humanitarian and international human rights law that may have lead to the most recent events.

The Gaza Strip, or simply Gaza, is home to 2 million Palestinians currently under a near-total blockade on the movement of people and goods in or out of the territory. It has been under military occupation since 1967 together with the West Bank and East Jerusalem. A border-wall surrounds the territory and only two-checkpoints for civilians exist today: one administered by Israel and a second by Egypt.

There is no functioning airport and Israel imposes an air- sea- and land-blockade since Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007. A permit system controlled by Israel regulates all entry and exit of civilians to other occupied Palestinian and Israeli territories, and has been accused of being arbitrary and opaque.  Although special permits for humanitarian reasons such as medical treatment exist, the same critique applies.

The Egyptian crossing also uses a permit system but would regularly close for months prior to February 2021 when it was made functional 'indefinitely' at the writing of this info-box. Prior to this, it remained closed for all but a few days between 2014 and 2018.

In 2005, the then-Israeli Prime Minister withdrew all military forces and Jewish citizens from Gaza citing the demographic-threat of an Arab majority in an Israeli state. Shortly after, an Islamic resistance movement called Hamas won legislative elections and eventually took over administering Gaza following infighting with the more moderate Palestinian group Fatah. Hamas does not recognise Israel's right to exist and is considered a terrorist organisation by most Western countries for its military-wing's use of suicide bombers against civilians, the use of tunnels to smuggle goods and attack Israeli settlements in Palestinian occupied territories, and most notoriously rocket-attacks on Israeli settlements and territory.

During Jewish holidays, attacks on Israeli settlements and territories, and at times for undefined reasons, Israeli may close all civilian and goods border-crossings on its side. Since 2007, import-restrictions on so-called dual-use goods that could be misused by Hamas to manufacture rockets or build underground tunnels into its territories and settlements in occupied territories are also in place. These include fuel, concrete, or water pipes. Successive bombing-raids by Israel on Gaza have left key infrastructure unable to be rebuilt. Israel accuses Hamas of misusing civilian buildings and infrastructure, as well as civilian populations, to hide military equipment. Today, less than 5% of fresh water in Gaza is drinkable, its sewage system has collapsed, and despite various negotiations having at times improved access of humanitarian aid and goods, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is catastrophic. The international community considers Israel the occupying power in Gaza, a status which puts special obligations on Israel regarding the humanitarian situation inside Gaza. Israel denies this status on the basis that it has no physical presence in Gaza and cites security-reasons as necessitating the blockade.

The UN calls the blockade of Gaza a form of collective punishment against its inhabitants, which is illegal under international humanitarian law. As part of the UN and shared EU position, Luxembourg calls for the end of the blockade.

Hamas, or Islamic Resistance Movement, has ruled Gaza since 2006 when it won the Palestinian legislative elections of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) in a surprise victory. Its origins lie with the First Intifada, when it emerged as offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, calling for jihad against Israel. Hamas' use of military and terrorist tactics (specifically rocket and suicide attacks) against the military occupation, denial of Israel's right to exist, partial refusal to engage in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and its original aim to establish an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine meant the international community and Israel sought to contain its influence.

Days after Hamas' electoral victory, the Quartet for Middle East Peace, consistent of the United Nations, the European Union, Russia, and the US, conditioned foreign aid to Palestinians on any new government aligning with the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel's right to exist, and accepting all previous peace-agreements. These conditions were essentially unacceptable to Hamas at the time, even if moderates had moved it to accept pre-1967 borders, a truce if not recognition with Israel amongst other changes to its previous hardline stances.

Outside pressure and internal differences gradually eroded trust and space for cooperation between Palestinian factions. Hamas would soon create its own security force, which raised tensions with Fatah, a more moderate and secular party which the international community expected to win and which continues to hold the Presidency of the PA under Mahmoud Abbas. In parallel, it emerged that the PA's Presidential Guard loyal to Fatah was given military hardware and support by outside powers to possibly overthrow Hamas. Factional in-fighting and clashes resulted in Hamas taking over Gaza militarily in 2007. In an attempts to improve security and pressure Hamas, Israel and Egypt imposed the Gaza Blockade which endures to this day.

Although repeated attempts have been made to reconcile parties and form a Palestinian Unity Government, most efforts were short-lived or never came to fruition. New elections keep being postponed by Abbas. Although there are multiple complex reasons for this, one argument is that Hamas is expected to win an even greater share of seats, although not necessarily a majority. Mediation by the UN and Egypt have made some recent progress. Observers argue the current state of affairs is in an untenable deadlock, with Hamas having returned to many of its more hardline positions. Intra-Palestinian and external differences will have to be resolved somehow. Countries such as Norway and Switzerland have rejected recognising Hamas as terrorist organisation to this end, so they may continue engaging in diplomatic exchange and political engagement.

Hamas does not tolerate dissent. Planning, organising, and attending protests against its rule incur arrests, and critical reporting can result in jailtime, torture, and beatings. Contact with any Israelis is tried as treason, and civilians are tried in military courts. Over the years, such repression has taken on different levels of severity, with recent anti-Hamas protests facing greater repression. During its rule, Hamas has been accused of using human-shields to protect its military-hardware and to purposefully store weapons or run military units in residential areas to shield it from Israeli air-strikes. The Gaza-strip has one of the highest population-densities in the world, making any strike against a military target almost certain to incur civilian casualties.

Since the 90s, but especially in 2008, 2012, 2014, 2018, and most recently in 2021, Hamas and other militant groups have regularly launched improvised unguided rockets and mortars into Israel. Their numbers have varied from low double-digits into the thousands, and Israel relies on an anti-missile defence system called Iron Dome to intercept about 90% of them. Although casualties are low, their target is causing terror. At various stages, cease-fires were signed and aid was allowed back into Gaza in exchange for a stop to rocket-fire.

Israel's own retaliations in Gaza have equally been considered possible war crimes or crimes against humanity due to their disproportionate impact on civilians and infrastructure. Under international humanitarian law, civilian infrastructure is protected and any attacks must be proportional to the military aim it seeks to achieve. Israel's process of designating military targets has faced intense scrutiny following investigations of civilians and civilian infrastructure being systematically targeted over the years. Specifically, water, energy, health, education, and agricultural infrastructure has suffered under repeated bombing campaigns.

The blockade makes reconstruction and maintenance often impossible, with more infrastructure still falling into disrepair. Most basic goods and medicine are in short supply or completely unavailable. A 2012 UN report estimated Gaza to become unliveable by 2020 due to a lack of available freshwater amongst other reasons. Today, less than 5% of water is drinkable, with untreated sewage and wastewater seeping into an overdrawn aquifer. Energy is available for about half a day at a time, the unemployment rate is almost 50% for adults and higher for young people. Covid restrictions imposed by Israel and later by Hamas have decimated what little economic activity survives. Previous reports have found a mental health crisis, with up to 90% of children being constantly afraid, and suffering from nightmares and bedwetting even a year after bombing raids.

Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism are often confused and conflated but can overlap.

Anti-Semitism is usually summarised as hatred and prejudice against Jews. However, the precise definition of antisemitism is subject to academic debate due to questions over where genuine critique of Zionism or the state of Israel and the occupation of Palestinian territories crosses over into anti-Semitism. A recent effort signed by hundreds of scholars from relevant academic-fields created the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, which gives the following definition:

• Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish)

This is further refined through guidelines such as:

• Antisemitism can be direct or indirect, explicit or coded. For example, “The Rothschilds control the world” is a coded statement about the alleged power of “the Jews” over banks and international finance. Similarly, portraying Israel as the ultimate evil or grossly exaggerating its actual influence can be a coded way of racializing and stigmatizing Jews. In many cases, identifying coded speech is a matter of context and judgement, taking account of these guidelines.

The term 'anti-Semitism' itself only came into existence in the late 19th century, when it would be picked up by modern Zionists influenced by European nationalism to articulate the need for a Jewish state. Specifically, this was done in the face of discrimination and persecution of Jews in Europe, which was substantial even before the pogroms in Russia or the rise of Nazism. Whilst Zionism also draws on historic and religious arguments for the creation of a Jewish state, not all Jews supported Zionism, nor did Zionists agree on the exact form of a future state in Palestine. These divisions survive to the present day, with questions regarding how secular or religious the state should be, or questions on settlements and annexation of occupied Palestinian territories, a two-State solution and beyond. However, a critique of Zionism is nowadays often equated with the critique of Israel's right to exist, not least because Zionist and Jew have become interchangeably used by anti-Semites.

Still, there exists a more nuanced debate lead by academics, activists, Israeli Jews, Palestinians and others, and documents such as the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism give reference points as to how we can have nuanced discussions or critique that don't fall into anti-Semitic tropes. Paying attention to these terms and how they are used in different contexts matters.

A two-State solution would see the creation of an independent democratic Palestinian state based on borders with Israel as they existed in 1967 before the Six-Day War. The West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (as capital) are considered occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) and form the territorial basis for a future Palestinian state.

Following the end of the First Intifada in 1993, the Oslo Accords and subsequent peace initiatives and treaties aimed at building a schedule or phasing of issues to be negotiated for achieving peace. As progress would be made, greater autonomy would be handed would be over to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for the administration of oPt until potential statehood could be considered. Negotiations have repeatedly broken down and treaties have not always been honoured.

Key issues remaining unsolved are over borders, the status of East Jerusalem (as Jerusalem is meant to become the shared capital under a two-State solution), the status of Israeli settlements, access of Palestinians to their lands, Palestinian refugees' right to return, and security guarantees.

Unfortunately, the past 30 years have made a two-State solution look increasingly unlikely. Israeli settlement activities in the form of expropriations, construction of settlements, and the building of border-walls in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have created new realities on the ground that preclude most of the original plans for a viable partition of territories. Subsequent UN Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions calling on Israeli to withdraw troops from oPt and calling its settlements illegal under international law have largely gone ignored. In addition, Israeli politics continues shifting right - meaning supporting continued settlements and annexation of land - just as the splintering of Palestinian leadership between Gaza and the West Bank weakened the potential for negotiating and implementing any agreement. Whilst the international community recognises the Palestinian Authority as main representative of Palestinians, ever more Palestinians see the PA as collaborators to the state which is occupying their lands and continuing to evict them from it. For Israel, there can be no real negotiations over Palestinian statehood as Hamas controls Gaza and rejects all such efforts.

Although Hamas controls Gaza since 2007 and the blockade and regular bombing of Gaza has seen ever-worsening humanitarian conditions, its popularity increased. This outcome is the exact reverse of the blockade's intentions, and the PA's support of it implicates it in the needless suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. Moreover, Hamas has been able to shoot rockets at Israel and Israeli settlements with greater precision and range even as tunnels for smuggling goods into Gaza have been systematically destroyed by Israel. When the Sheikh Jarrah and al-Aqsa protests flared up, protests were initially independent of formal Palestinian institutions such as the PA or groups such as Hamas. Yet, Hamas was able to capitalise on them by positioning itself as a defender of Palestinian interests to a new generation of protestors. Its own governance structures keep evolving, and it is likely to gain a political foothold in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the PA, postponed new elections once more as it is likely Hamas would win them.

What remains of the two-State solution are arguments for limited Palestinian statehood within parts of the West Bank (Israel currently controls about 60% of it directly), as does a form of confederacy (or 1.5 State solution), or an unacceptable to all 1-state solution. Violent protests and Israel and Palestinian mobs in cities across Israel that include mixed populations further add to the tensions that exist within Israel and the oPt at this stage. Even if the US as main ally of Israel were to pressure Israel to conform with international law, it is doubtful what remains salvageable of the original two-State solution.

Luxembourg supports a two-State solution based on the borders as they existed in 1967 before the Six-Day War. This is in line with EU and UN positions. Whilst 9 EU Member States* already recognise Palestine as a state, Luxembourg does not. Foreign minister Jean Asselborn argues that for any such recognition to make a material difference it has to come as part of a greater diplomatic effort, such as the EU as a whole recognising Palestinian statehood. To this end, Asselborn has repeatedly pushed for a common position by the EU, but to no avail.

As most UN and EU Member States, Luxembourg considers Israeli settlements in the West Bank as illegal under international law, as well as condemning them as colonisation undermining the two-State peace process. Previously, Asselborn threatened Luxembourg would recognise Palestine unilaterally should Israel annex the West Bank.

During the Gaza protests in 2018 and the most recent escalations in 2021, Luxembourg supported calls for respective UN Human Rights Council special sessions on events in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel. The latest such call and subsequent resolution established an ongoing independent, international commission of inquiry  looking at all possible abuses committed against international humanitarian and international human rights law that may have lead to the most recent events.

*Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden